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Abstract
In resisting attempts to explain the unity of a whole in terms of a
multiplicity of interacting parts, quantum mechanics calls for an ex-
planatory concept that proceeds in the opposite direction: from unity
to multiplicity. Being part of the Scientific Image of the world, the
theory concerns the process by which (the physical aspect of) what
Sellars called the Manifest Image of the world comes into being. This
process consists in the progressive differentiation of an intrinsically un-
differentiated entity. By entering into reflexive spatial relations, this
entity gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the re-
flexive quality of the relations is not taken into account, and (ii) what
looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is
reified. If there is a distinctly quantum domain, it is a non-spatial and
non-temporal dimension across which the transition from the unity of
this entity to the multiplicity of the world takes place. Instead of be-
ing constituents of the physical world, subatomic particles, atoms, and
molecules are instrumental in its manifestation. These conclusions are
based on the following interpretive principle and its more direct conse-
quences: whenever the calculation of probabilities calls for the addition
of amplitudes, the distinctions we make between the alternatives lack
objective reality. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between
regions of space, this principle implies that, owing to the indefiniteness
of positions, the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is
incomplete: the existence of a real-valued spatiotemporal background
is an unrealistic idealization. This guarantees the existence of observ-
ables whose values are real per se, as against “real by virtue of being
indicated by the values of observables that are real per se.” Applied to
alternatives involving distinctions between things, it implies that, in-
trinsically, all fundamental particles are numerically identical and thus
identifiable with the aforementioned undifferentiated entity.
Keywords: Interpretation · Quantum mechanics · Measurement prob-
lem · Macroscopic objects · Manifestation · Localizable particles
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1 Introduction
It seems safe to say that there is a mismatch between what quantummechan-
ics is trying to tell us about the physical world and how we are programmed—
arguably by our very neurobiology—to understand the physical world. The
nub of the matter appears to be that while we seek to model physical real-
ity “from the bottom up” (i.e., on the basis of some ultimate multiplicity,
whether it be a multitude of ultimate building blocks or the multiplicity of
points or events in an intrinsically differentiated space or spacetime), what
the theory is trying to tell us is that reality is structured “from the top
down.” In resisting attempts to explain the unity of a whole in terms of a
multiplicity of interacting parts, quantum mechanics calls for an explana-
tory concept that proceeds in the opposite direction, from the unity of an
intrinsically undifferentiated entity E to the multiplicity of the macroworld,
by means of an atemporal process of differentiation.
Where I see almost all the other interpretive efforts at an impasse is that
none of them seriously asks, “Why do we have this theory in the first place?”
What I propose in this paper is that we have this theory because it concerns
the manifestation of the macroworld. What I mean by the “macroworld”
is the totality of measurement-independent properties—properties that are
real per se, as against “real by virtue of being indicated by values of observ-
ables that are real per se.” And what I mean by its “manifestation” is its
emergence from E . By entering into reflexive spatial relations, this intrin-
sically undifferentiated entity gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity
of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is not taken into account,
and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the
relations is reified.
Today it is widely assumed that the classical domain postulated by Bohr
should be understood as emergent, and that quantum mechanics ought to
explain its emergence. Efforts to understand “the quantum origins of the
classical” [1], “the appearance of a classical world in quantum theory” [2], or
“the quantum-to-classical transition” [3] capitalize on decoherence. Unsur-
prisingly this approach is not without its critics, for as a purely quantum-
mechanical phenomenon, confined to the unitary propagation of correlations,
decoherence has no bearing on the existence of the correlata. Unitary dy-
namics cannot be expected to account for the existence of a domain in which
measurements have outcomes.
What is proposed here is that the macroworld emerges not from a quan-
tum domain but from a single entity that transcends categorization. If there
is a distinctly quantum domain, it is not a domain of constituent objects but
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a non-spatial and non-temporal dimension across which the transition from
unity to multiplicity takes place. While atoms and subatomic particles are
instrumental in this transition, their instrumentality cannot be understood
in compositional terms. Ultimately there is but one constituent, to wit, E .
Before I can attempt to substantiate these claims, some housecleaning
is in order. It will come as no surprise that Sect. 2 is devoted to the mea-
surement problem. On the face of it, the problem is that
according to the unitary development of a quantum dynamics
alone, nothing does happen in the world: no click in a particle
detector, no definite measurement outcome, no particle track in a
Wilson chamber, no interference pattern at a scintillation screen,
and no observable effects of an atom in a Paul trap. [4, p. 325,
original emphasis]
Either the unitary dynamics is not all that takes place or it is not at all
what takes place. Current discussions of the problem [5, 6] assume a tripar-
tite measurement process involving a continuous dynamical process called
“premeasurement.” A dynamical process continuous in time implies the ex-
istence of an intrinsically and completely differentiated spatiotemporal back-
ground. Because such a background cannot be considered objective, as will
be shown, no unitary dynamics takes place, and the measurement problem
in its unsolvable form—the so-called objectification problem—evaporates.
The following problem, however, does not. The theory’s irreducible empir-
ical core is a probability calculus. This presupposes the events to which,
and on the basis of which, it serves to assign probabilities. While, therefore,
it cannot be expected to account for their occurrence, it must obviously be
consistent with it. The real measurement problem consists in identifying
observables whose values are real per se, and in explaining how they are dis-
tinct from observables that have (definite) values only if (and when) their
values are indicated by macroscopic devices, events, or states of affairs.
To be able to address this problem, we need to know why quantum me-
chanics requires us to use two distinct Lorentz-invariant calculational rules,
and we need to pinpoint the essential difference between their respective
conditions of application. Why do we have to add amplitudes, rather than
probabilities, whenever the conditions stipulated by the second rule are met?
This question is answered in the form of a new interpretive principle, which
is introduced and discussed in Sect. 3.
Applied (in Sect. 4) to alternatives involving distinctions between re-
gions of space, this interpretive principle leads to the conclusion that space
cannot be something intrinsically differentiated, something that has parts.
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What, then, furnishes space with its so-called parts? The short answer is:
macroscopic detectors. Suitably amplified, it leads to the conclusion that,
owing to the indefiniteness of positions, the spatiotemporal differentiation
of the physical world is incomplete—it does not go “all the way down.”
The existence of a real-valued spatiotemporal background is an unrealis-
tic idealization. This is what makes it possible to identify (in Sect. 5) the
observables whose values are real per se. They are the positions of macro-
scopic objects—no surprise there, except that the term “macroscopic object”
is given a rigorous definition.
Applied (in Sect. 6) to alternatives involving distinctions between things,
the same interpretive principle implies the nonexistence of both diachronic
and synchronic individuators. Nothing therefore stands in the way of the
claim that “identical particles” are identical in the strong sense of numer-
ical identity, nor of the claim that all fundamental particles—not only the
indistinguishable ones—are identically the same entity E . The validity of
these claims is reinforced in Sect. 7.
Section 8 addresses theorems to the effect that there is no such thing as
a localizable particle [7, 8, 9, 10, 11], which has led to the conclusion that
particle talk is “strictly fictional” [11]. These theorems are valid if local-
izability is defined relative to the intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal
manifold presupposed by relativistic quantum field theory, but precisely for
this reason they are also irrelevant. Observables that are local relative to
this manifold cannot be measured. Real-world detectors monitor regions
that are defined relative to the objective system of macroscopic positions,
rather than relative to this non-objective manifold.
Section 9 explains why the idea that a fundamental particle is a literally
pointlike object is not only unwarranted on both theoretical and experi-
mental grounds but also inconsistent with the incompleteness of the world’s
spatial differentiation. The forms of composite objects resolve themselves
into spatial relations between formless entities. And since these entities are
numerically identical, the shapes of things resolve themselves into reflexive
relations—relations between E and itself. This conclusion paves the way for
the principal affirmation of the present paper in Sects. 10 and 11, according
to which quantum mechanics presents us with a new kind of causality. This
causality, which underlies the atemporal process of manifestation, is also the
only kind that is applicable to the distinctly quantum domain, inasmuch as
the temporal concept of causation, which links states or events across time
or spacetime, has meaningful application only within the macroworld.
In the final section I discuss how far the central idea of the present pa-
per conforms to what is considered by many to be the most defensible form
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of scientific realism, to wit, structural realism, particularly the respective
versions of ontic structural realism (OSR) propounded by Ladyman and
Ross [12] and by Esfeld and Lam [13, 14]. The weakness of OSR lies in
its inability to explain how structure is realized in the physical world. To
distinguish between a structure that is physical in some sense from a struc-
ture that is purely mathematical, one has to go beyond OSR. What OSR
is lacking is the concept of a substance that manifests structure by entering
into reflexive relations—both the indefinite relations which are instrumental
in the manifestation of the macroworld, and the resulting definite relations
which constitute the macroworld.
2 The measurement problem
The irreducible empirical core of quantum mechanics is a probability calcu-
lus. Both the events to which and the data on the basis of which it assigns
probabilities are measurement outcomes. That much is common to all for-
mulations of quantum mechanics—Heisenberg’s matrix formulation (which
is particularly useful in solving harmonic oscillator and angular momentum
problems), Schro¨dinger’s wave-function formulation (which shifts the focus
from observables to states), Feynman’s path-integral formulation (which
shifts the focus from states to transition probabilities), the density-matrix
formulation (which can treat mixed states with ease), Wigner’s phase-space
formulation (which is particularly useful in considering the classical limit),
to name but a few [15].
Though a distinction has to be made between formulations and interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics, the choice of a formulation cannot but bias
the range of available interpretations. Current literature on the quantum
measurement problem [5, 6], which still follows the first rigorous formula-
tions of the problem in the monographs of von Neumann [16] and Pauli [17],
is biased toward the wave-function formulation, which according to Styer
and coauthors [15] “leaves the conceptual misimpression that [the] wave-
function is a physical entity rather than a mathematical tool.” Certainly
a major factor contributing to this bias is the manner in which quantum
mechanics is taught. While a junior-level classical mechanics course de-
votes a considerable amount of time to different formulations of classical
mechanics—Newtonian, Lagrangian, Hamiltonian, least action, etc.—even
graduate-level courses emphasize the wave-function formulation almost to
the exclusion of all variants.
Current discussions of the measurement problem accordingly proceed on
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the assumption that there is a measurement process, and that this takes
place in three steps: the system or state preparation, a continuous dynam-
ical process called “premeasurement,” and the pointer reading or objectifi-
cation. A dynamical process continuous in time implies the existence of an
intrinsically and completely differentiated spatiotemporal background.1 In
this paper I shall widen the range of interpretive options by not taking for
granted the existence of such a background.
Any attempt to go beyond the theory’s irreducible empirical core calls
for at least one interpretive principle. (Most interpretations incorporate
several such principles.) One all but universally accepted principle con-
cerns the ontological status of the coordinate points and instants on which
the wave function ψ(x, t) ≡ 〈x|ψ(t)〉 functionally depends. It is generally
taken for granted that these points and instants correspond one-to-one to
the elements of an intrinsically and completely differentiated spatiotemporal
background.2 If this interpretive principle is rejected, the wave function’s de-
pendence on time cannot be interpreted as the continuous time-dependence
of an evolving instantaneous physical state, inasmuch as this presupposes a
completely differentiated spatiotemporal background. The parameter t in
|ψ(t)〉 then can only refer to the time of the measurement to the possible
outcomes of which the wave function serves to assign probabilities. Nor is it
possible to endorse the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, which Dirac [18, p. 46–47]
formulated as follows:
The expression that an observable “has a particular value” for
a particular state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the
special case when a measurement of the observable is certain to
lead to the particular value, so that the state is an eigenstate of
the observable.
In the absence of a completely differentiated spatiotemporal background, it
cannot be the case that an observable A has the value a at every instant t for
which A|ψ(t)〉 = a|ψ(t)〉 holds. The information provided by this eigenvalue
equation is conditional: if A is measured at the time t then the value a is
found to be possessed at the time t with probability 1. This also means that
probability 1 is not sufficient for “is” or “has.” For a value to be possessed,
a measurement has to be made.
Hence, if we use the wave-function formulation to assign a probability
p to a possible outcome q2 of a measurement made at the time t2, on the
1Here Lorentz invariance is assumed to the extent that temporal differentiation and
spatial differentiation are mutually implied.
2At least this is the case outside of attempts at formulating a quantum theory of gravity.
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basis of the actual outcome q1 of a measurement made at the time t1, we
should think of the wave function not as an evolving physical state but
as a “computing machine” with inputs and outputs: if we plug in q1, t1,
q2, and t2, then p pops out. (If the measurement at t1 is not a complete
measurement, p will also depend on outcomes of other measurements.) It
bears repetition: t1 and t2 refer to the times of the measurements on the basis
of which, and to the possible outcomes of which, the wave function serves
to assign probabilities. As the inputs q1 and q2 are given by macroscopic
“pointers,” so the times t1 and t2 are given by macroscopic clocks.
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While the objectification problem evaporates if no intrinsically and com-
pletely differentiated spatiotemporal background is postulated, the measure-
ment problem does not. Quantum theory’s irreducible empirical core pre-
supposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it serves to assign
probabilities. While, therefore, it cannot be expected to account for their
occurrence, it has to be consistent with it. For this to be the case, it must
be possible to look upon the values of certain observables as real per se, as
against “real by virtue of being indicated by values of observables that are
real per se.” The real measurement problem consists in identifying observ-
ables whose values are real per se, and in explaining how they are distinct
from observables that have (definite) values only if (and when) their values
are indicated by macroscopic devices, events, or states of affairs. To be able
to address this problem, however, we first need to know why quantum me-
chanics requires us to use two distinct Lorentz-invariant calculational rules,
and we need to pinpoint the essential difference between their respective
conditions of application.
3 Yet another interpretive principle
A salient feature of the quantum-mechanical probability calculus is the
nonexistence of dispersion-free probability algorithms. A particular instance
3The following question has been asked by a reviewer (to whom I am grateful for many
valuable suggestions): If the wave function does not describe some kind of (holistic) phys-
ical reality, how is it possible for experiments to act on the wave function in preparation
procedures? The way I see it, the wave function is not something on which experiments
can act. Preparation procedures define wave functions, which serve to assign probabilities
to the possible outcomes of measurements. On the other hand, nothing stands in the way
of positing such a reality, and of thinking of the wave function as a means to describe it
by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements. We may think of a
preparation procedure as acting on such a reality, its effect being what the wave function
so describes.
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of this feature is the uncertainty principle. Feynman, letting the particu-
lar stand for the general, defines the uncertainty principle in terms of its
observable consequences:
Any determination of the alternative taken by a process capable
of following more than one alternative destroys the interference
between alternatives. [19, p. 9]
In a previous paper [20] I formulated Feynman’s version in the following way,
taking into account that the mere possibility of determining the alternative
taken can “destroy” the interference between alternatives.
Premise A. Quantum mechanics provides us with algorithms for assigning
probabilities to possible measurement outcomes on the basis of actual
outcomes. Probabilities are calculated by summing over alternatives.
Alternatives are possible sequences of measurement outcomes. Asso-
ciated with each alternative is a complex number called “amplitude.”
Premise B. To calculate the probability of a particular outcome of a mea-
surement M2, given the actual outcome of a measurement M1, choose
a sequence of measurements that may be made in the meantime, and
apply the appropriate rule.
Rule A. If the intermediate measurements are made (or if it is possible
to infer from other measurements what their outcomes would have
been if they had been made), first square the absolute values of the
amplitudes associated with the alternatives and then add the results.
Rule B. If the intermediate measurements are not made (and if it is not
possible to infer from other measurements what their outcomes would
have been), first add the amplitudes associated with the alternatives
and then square the absolute value of the result.
The need for the parenthetical phrases in Rules A and B can be illustrated
with the “quantum eraser” experiment discussed by Englert, Scully, and
Walther [21, 22, 23]. As long as the two microwave resonance cavities are
separated, the photon makes it possible to obtain which-way information,
and this possibility “destroys” the interference between the alternatives.4
4It is often stated that the photon (or the cavity field) stores (or contains) which-way
information, but this is misleading at best. Strictly speaking, only an actual state of affairs
can contain information. The photon only makes it possible to obtain that information,
by detecting it in either of the cavities. The detection of the photon in either cavity
creates what the information conveys, namely the fact that the atom went through the
corresponding slit.
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It should be noted that Premise A defines alternatives in terms of mea-
surement outcomes. The only referents needed to formulate the laws of quan-
tum mechanics are measurement outcomes and their correlations. However,
the events that the theory correlates are measurement outcomes only in the
restricted sense that they indicate—make available information about—the
values of observables, irrespective of an experimenter’s intentions, and irre-
spective of the presence of an observer. It is also noteworthy that the time
at which M2 is made need not be later than the time at which M1 is made.
The quantum-mechanical probability calculus allows us to assign probabil-
ities not only to the outcomes of later measurements on the basis of the
outcomes of earlier measurements but also vice versa. As agents in a suc-
cessively experienced world, we are of course more interested in predictions
than in postdictions, but this temporal asymmetry is external to the the-
ory’s irreducible empirical core. It justifies the notion that quantum states
evolve towards the future as little as it justifies the notion that quantum
states evolve towards the past.
From the point of view adopted by the standard approach to the mea-
surement problem, Rule B seems uncontroversial. Superpositions are “nor-
mal,” and what is normal does not call for explanation. What calls for
explanation is the existence of a mixture that admits of an ignorance in-
terpretation. According to the present approach, the uncontroversial rule
is Rule A, inasmuch as it is what classical probability theory leads one to
expect. What calls for explanation is why we have to add amplitudes, rather
than probabilities, whenever the conditions stipulated by Rule B are met.
To this question I propose the following answer:
YAIP Whenever quantum mechanics instructs us to first add the ampli-
tudes associated with alternatives and then square the absolute value
of the result, the distinctions we make between the alternatives corre-
spond to nothing in the physical world.
The converse does not hold. Situations in which quantum mechanics in-
structs us to add probabilities do not automatically warrant that the dis-
tinctions we make between the alternatives are objective.5
5The experiment discussed by Englert, Scully, and Walter provides a counterexample.
As long as the photon is inside the union of the two resonance cavities, the probability of
detecting the atom at the screen is given by Rule A, yet the atom cannot be said to have
taken a particular slit. This becomes clear when interference is restored, by (i) opening the
electro-optical shutters that separate the two cavities and (ii) sorting the detected atoms
according as the photosensor situated between the shutters does, or does not, respond.
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In making the theory’s irreducible empirical core my starting point, I
do not intend to advocate a radical empiricism or a metaphysically ster-
ile instrumentalism; my only reason for doing so is to clear the terrain of
unwarranted assumptions.6 I am aware that we cannot conceive of or dis-
cuss any subject matter independently of our thoughts or our language.
A completely mind-independent reality would be epistemically inaccessible.
However, I am not concerned with the question whether mind-independent
reality can be attributed to the physical world. What I am interested in is
how to identify those observables to which measurement-independent reality
can be attributed.
While YAIP imposes limits on the extent to which our conceptual dis-
tinctions can be considered objective, it is not intended as being merely a
statement of our practical or conceptual limitations. To say that our theories
are constructions is to state the obvious, but it does not explain why most of
our falsifiable constructions turn out to be false. Each time we learn a way
things are not, we come closer to knowing the way things are; knowledge is
most objective precisely when it tells us where we are wrong.
To illustrate this point, the epistemologist von Glasersfeld [25] has made
use of the difference between a match and a fit. He imagined a skipper who,
in the dark of a stormy night, without navigational aids, passes a narrow
strait whose contour he does not know. Epistemologically, we are in the
skipper’s position. If he reaches the open sea without mishap, he has found
a course that fits the strait; if next time he takes the same course, he will
again pass safely. What he has not obtained is a map that matches the
coastline. To precisely locate at least one point of the coastline, he must
come into contact with it—at the risk of wrecking his ship. What YAIP
asserts is that whenever quantum mechanics requires the use of Rule B,
we “wreck our ship” by attributing objectivity to the distinctions we make
between the alternatives.
The realism I am defending is a realism in the moderate and episte-
mologically justified sense of a fit. It is first of all a realism about the
macroworld. It asserts the measurement-independence of the macroscopic
6Chris Fuchs [24, p. 46] knows all about being accused of instrumentalism: “Believe
me, you’ve got to stand your ground with these guys when their label guns fly from their
holsters! I say this because if one asks ‘Why the quantum?’ in this context, it can only
mean that one is being realist about the reasons for one’s instrumentalities. In other
words, even if quantum theory is purely a theory for apportioning and structuring degrees
of belief, the question of ‘Why the quantum?’ is nonetheless a question of what it is about
the actual, real, objective character of the world that compels us to use this framework
for reasoning rather than another.”
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observables that will be defined in Sect. 5, without infringing the univer-
sal validity of quantum mechanics. It is also a realism about the measured
values of microphysical observables. Unlike the minimal interpretation as
defined by Mittelstaedt [5, pp. 9–11], which “avoids statements about object
systems and their properties and instead refers to observed data only” (i.e.,
to pointer values), it allows statements about the values of observables—if
and when they are measured. Unlike the realistic interpretation as defined
by Mittelstaedt [5, pp. 12–14], it eschews the notion that the measured value
of an observable “pertains actually to the object system after the measure-
ment,” which amounts to an endorsement of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
It is, moreover, a realism about a single independently existing entity E ,
which manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations,
as will be spelled out in Sects. 6 through 11.
4 A two-slit experiment and its implications
In this section the interpretive principle formulated in the previous section
will be applied to the two-slit experiment with electrons, which according
to Feynman [26, Sect. 1.1] “has in it the heart of quantum mechanics” and
“is impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way.”
If Rule B applies, then according to YAIP the distinction we make be-
tween pL = “the electron went through the left slit (L)” and pR = “the
electron went through the right slit (R)” cannot be considered objective. It
is not the case that a given electron goes through either L or R. (Because
the build-up of the tell-tale interference pattern has been demonstrated one
electron at a time [27], it is permissible here to refer to a “given” electron.)
Somehow an electron can go through both slits—as a whole, without being
divided into parts that go through different slits. But how?
Our difficulty in understanding how this is possible reveals something
peculiar about how we tend to think about space. We are inclined to think
that L and R are intrinsically distinct. But how do they differ? They are
cutouts in a slit plate—things that have been removed, things that are no
longer there. What difference do they leave behind once they have been
removed? The difference between the positions they previously occupied?
But positions are properties, and properties exist only if they are possessed.
How does a physical property come to be possessed? Being the outcome
of a measurement is sufficient for a property to be possessed—at the time of
the measurement—but is it also necessary? We have seen that it is. Hence
L (or R) only exists (as a possessed property) if Rule A applies, and if the
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electron is found to have taken the left (or right) slit.
If the distinction we make between the propositions pL and pR cannot
be considered objective, then the distinction between L and R cannot be real
per se. The electron’s position at the (indeterminate) time when it passes
the slit plate is the union L∪R. If this were objectively divided into distinct
regions L and R, the electron’s position at that time would be affected by
the distinctness of L and R; it would be divided by it. Yet a position is not
something that can be divided.7 The indivisibility of the electron’s position
therefore implies the indivisibility of L ∪R.
But if L ∪ R is not intrinsically divided, then physical space cannot be
intrinsically divided. If at all we think of it as a self-existent or substantial
expanse, we must think of it as undifferentiated, without parts. The question
then is, what furnishes space with its so-called parts? Or rather: what
furnishes the physical world with its spatial parts? The short answer is:
detectors. Detectors, and more generally measuring devices, exist not only
in man-made laboratories. Any device with a sensitive region D and capable
of indicating the presence of something in D qualifies as a detector, and any
device capable of providing information about the value of an observable
qualifies as a measuring device. An idealized position measurement uses an
array of detectors, and if projection-operator-valued probability-measures
are used, the detectors’ sensitive regions Di correspond to a partition of
some larger region. If an object is found in Di (but not in any smaller
region inside Di), the position attributable to it is Di—not any smaller
region inside Di, let alone a sharp position.
By those of its macroscopic properties that define a spatial region D, a
detector realizes D, and by realizing a spatial region D, a detector makes it
possible to attribute to a microphysical object the property of being in D.
That this bears generalization was stressed by Bohr [29, 30, 31]: the mea-
surement apparatus is needed not only to indicate the possession of a prop-
erty (by a system) or a value (by an observable), but also, and in the first
place, to make a set of properties or values available for attribution. In
the absence of an apparatus that realizes a set of properties qi, the proper-
ties qi are not possible attributes, and the distinctions we make between the
statements “system S has the property qi” cannot be considered objective.
(The present paper goes beyond Bohr in that it does not split the world
into a classical and a quantum domain but instead places the domain of
7What is at issue here is the divisibility of a position. Interference fringes have been
observed using C60 molecules and a grating with 50-nm-wide slits and a 100-nm period [28].
We do not picture parts of such a molecule as getting separated by many times 100 nm
and then reassembling into a ball less than a nanometer across.
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macroscopic observables squarely within the quantum domain.)
As an illustration, consider the measurement of a component of the spin
of a particle of spin-1/2. In this case the apparatus serves not only to
indicate an outcome—the component’s value at the time of measurement—
but also, and in the first place, to realize an axis (by means of the gradient
of a magnetic field) and to thereby make two possible values available for
attribution. It creates possibilities to which probabilities can be assigned.
Without an apparatus that defines an axis, the two values do not even exist
as possibilities.8
It will be instructive to briefly concern ourselves with the question how
we come to believe that positions exist by themselves, without being pos-
sessed. After all, we more or less readily agree that red, round, or a smile
cannot exist without a red or round object or a smiling face. This is why
the Cheshire cat strikes us as funny. Why are positions treated differently?
Why don’t self-existent positions make us laugh? What comes to mind is
that the role position plays in perception is analogous to the role substance
plays in conception.
For Aristotle, a property was anything in the world that can be the
predicate of a sentence composed of a subject and a predicate, whereas a
substance was something in the world that cannot be predicated of anything
else. Substance, so defined, serves two purposes: it betokens independent
existence, and it reifies the manner in which a conjunction of predicative sen-
tences with the same subject term bundles predicates. (Property-bundling
substances are often referred to as Lockean substances.)
Turning to the neuroscientific data [32, 33], one is struck by the abun-
dance of feature maps. A feature map is a layer of the cerebral cortex in
which cells map a particular phenomenal variable (such as hue, brightness,
shape, viewer-centered depth, motion, or texture) in such a way that adja-
cent cells generally correspond to adjacent locations in the visual field. In
the macaque monkey, as many as 32 distinct feature maps have been iden-
tified [34]. Every phenomenal variable has a separate map (and usually not
just one but several maps at different levels within the neuro-anatomical
hierarchy) except location, which somehow is present in all maps. If there is
a green box here and a red ball there, “green here” and “red there” are sig-
8Generations of students have been puzzled by the special role that the z axis plays in
descriptions of the stationary states of atomic hydrogen. How does the atom chose this
particular axis? The answer, of course, is that it doesn’t. Quantum-mechanical probability
assignments are conditional on preparations. In describing the atom’s stationary states
we assume that the z component of its angular momentum has been measured, along with
its energy and its total angular momentum.
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naled by neurons from one feature map, and “boxy here” and “round there”
are signaled by neurons from another feature map. “Here” and “there” are
present in both maps, and this is how we know that green goes with boxy
and red goes with round. While it is still far from clear how feature inte-
gration is achieved by the brain, it is clear that position is the integrating
factor.
Thus while substance serves as the “conceptual glue” that binds an ob-
ject’s properties, position serves as the “perceptual glue” that binds an
object’s phenomenal features. Failure to distinguish between perceptual
objects and conceptual objects, or between the two types of “glue,” there-
fore appears to be at least partly responsible for the substantivalist concep-
tion of space,9 which in the second half of the nineteenth century merged
with the set-theoretic conception of space. On the latter conception von
Weizsa¨cker [35, p. 130] remarked:
The conception of the continuum as potential, which originated
with Aristotle, appears to be more suitable for the quantum
theoretical way of thinking than is the set-theoretical conception
of an actually existing transfinite manifold of “real numbers,”
or of the spatial points they designate. The “real number” is a
free creation of the human mind and perhaps not conformable
to reality.
If proof is needed that the set-theoretic conception of space is not con-
formable to reality, it is the ability of a particle to simultaneously go through
more slits than one. If there is a single system S for which the distinction
between “S went through L” and “S went through R” cannot be considered
objective, then the distinction we make between L and R cannot be so con-
sidered, let alone all of the distinctions that are implicit in the set-theoretic
conception of space.
The idealized detectors consider in this section do not exist. As a conse-
quence of the uncertainty principle, sharply localized and sharply bounded
spatial regions cannot be realized. The kind of position measurement that
uses an array of detectors with sharply localized and sharply bounded re-
gions is a heuristic fiction. But if such regions cannot be realized (as the
sensitive regions of detectors), then they cannot be attributed (as positions).
It follows that the spatial differentiation of the physical world cannot be
9It is also what makes us conceive of features present in the same place as features
of the same object, and to conceive of features present in different places as features of
different objects (or of different parts of the same object), so that we are thoroughly baffled
by the ability of an indivisible object to pass simultaneously through different slits.
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complete—it cannot go “all the way down.” We can conceive of a partition
of the physical world into finite regions so small that none of them can be
attributed (as a position) because none of them is available for attribution.
The same goes for the world’s temporal differentiation, and this not only
because of the relativistic interdependence of distances and durations. Just
as the properties of quantum systems or the values of quantum observables
need to be realized—made available for attribution—by macroscopic sys-
tems, so the times at which properties or values are possessed need to be
realized by macroscopic clocks. And just as it is impossible for macroscopic
systems to realize sharp positions, so it is impossible for macroscopic clocks
to realize sharp times [36]. Therefore neither the spatial nor the temporal
differentiation of the physical world goes “all the way down.”
5 The macroworld
If quantum theory is to accommodate value-indicating events or states of
affairs, it must be possible to look upon the values of certain observables
as real per se, as against “real by virtue of being indicated by the values of
observables that are real per se.” For this, something has to give. Neither
can actually possessed positions be sharp, nor can all unsharp positions be
merely distributions over possible outcomes of unperformed measurements.
There has to be a middle ground; there must be unsharp positions that are
actually possessed, rather than being merely probability distributions over
unrealized possibilities. And indeed, as I shall argue presently, there is a
(non-empty) class of objects whose unsharp positions remain unresolved by
measurements.
In a world that is incompletely differentiated spacewise, the next best
thing to a sharp trajectory is a trajectory that is so sharp that the bun-
dle of sharp trajectories over which it is statistically distributed is never
probed. In other words, the next best thing to an object with a sharp po-
sition is an object whose position probability distribution is and remains
so narrow that there are no detectors with narrower position probability
distributions—detectors that could probe the region over which the object’s
unsharp position extends. If the spatiotemporal differentiation of the phys-
ical world does not go “all the way down,” such objects must exist. What
shall we call them? They are not “classical” because classical objects follow
sharp trajectories. They are not “macroscopic” in the sense of being so large
and/or massive as to behave like classical objects FAPP (for all practical
purposes). If I call them “macroscopic objects,” it is in the more rigorous
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sense just spelled out. The macroworld, as the term is used in this paper,
is the totality macroscopic positions. (“Macroscopic positions” is short for
“positions of macroscopic objects.”)
What can be deduced from this characterization of macroscopic positions
is that the events by which their values are indicated are (diachronically)
correlated in ways that are consistent with the laws of motion that quantum
mechanics yields in the classical limit. For any given time t the following
holds: if every event that indicates a macroscopic position prior to the time
t were taken into account, then—given the necessarily finite accuracy of
position-indicating events—every event that indicates a macroscopic posi-
tion at a later time would be consistent with all earlier position-indicating
events and the classical laws motion. There is, however, one exception: to
permit a macroscopic object—the proverbial pointer—to indicate the value
of an observable, its position must be allowed to change unpredictably if
and when it serves to indicate a value.
Macroscopic objects thus follow trajectories that are only counterfactu-
ally indefinite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an
imaginary spatiotemporal background that is more differentiated than the
physical world. No value-indicating event reveals the indefiniteness of a
macroscopic position (in the only way it could, through a departure from
what the classical laws predict). The testable correlations between outcomes
of measurements of macroscopic positions are therefore consistent with both
the classical and the quantum laws. This is what makes it possible to stip-
ulate that macroscopic positions are real per se, in a way that is not liable
to Bell’s [37] critique of FAPP solutions to the measurement problem.
A similar stipulation has recently been proposed by Bub [38]:
The problem of how to account for the definiteness or determi-
nateness of the part of the universe that records the outcomes of
quantum measurements or random quantum events is a consis-
tency problem. The question is whether it is consistent with the
quantum dynamics to take some part of the universe, including
the registration of quantum events by our macroscopic measur-
ing instruments, as having a definite “being-thus,” characterized
by definite properties.
Bub’s answer to this question is affirmative:
If we take [the preferred observable] R as the decoherence “pointer”
selected by environmental decoherence, then it follows that the
macroworld is always definite because of the nature of the deco-
herence interaction coupling environmental degrees of freedom
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to macroworld degrees of freedom (a contingent feature of the
quantum dynamics), and it follows from the theorem10 that fea-
tures of the microworld correlated with R are definite. In other
words, decoherence guarantees the continued definiteness or per-
sistent objectivity of the macroworld, if we stipulate that R is
the decoherence “pointer.”
Bub’s answer, however, is liable to the objection [40] that taking the pointer
selected by environmental decoherence as definite by stipulation amounts to
deliberately ignoring the off-diagonal elements of the density operator for the
larger system that includes the environment. This may be justifiable FAPP
but remains subject to Bell’s critique of FAPP solutions to the measurement
problem. Bub [38] has countered this objection, insisting that
The argument here is not that decoherence provides a dynam-
ical explanation of how an indefinite quantity becomes definite
in a measurement process—Bell [41] has aptly criticized this ar-
gument as a ‘for all practical purposes’ (FAPP) solution to the
measurement problem.11
Bell’s critique of FAPP solutions [37], however, is not limited to quantum dy-
namical accounts of the emergence of classical behavior. It applies whenever
small quantities are treated as zero on the ground that their consequences
are unobservable FAPP, and in particular to any attempt to solve the mea-
surement problem by invoking environment-induced decoherence.
Decoherence-based solutions to the measurement problem are suspect for
another reason. As critics of this approach have pointed out, among them
Mittelstaedt [5, p. 112] and Busch et al. [6, p. 123], the quantum-mechanical
coherence of the system composed of apparatus and object system is merely
displaced into the degrees of freedom of the environment. The objectification
problem reappears as a statement about the system composed of environ-
ment, apparatus, and object system. Since the mixture obtained by tracing
out the environment does not admit an ignorance interpretation with re-
spect to the pointer basis, environment-induced decoherence does not solve
the objectification problem.
10The theorem referred to by Bub is proved in Ref. [39].
11In the paper cited, Bell examines a paper by Hepp [42] whose abstract contains the fol-
lowing statement: “In several explicitly soluble models, the measurement leads to macro-
scopically different ‘pointer positions’ and to a rigorous ‘reduction of the wave packet’
with respect to all local observables.”
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Nor is there any need to solve this pseudo-problem. If one starts by
assuming that quantum states are evolving physical states, one needs some-
thing more than physical to get from possibilities to actualities, and this mir-
acle cannot be wrought by decoherence (nor, for that matter, by anything
else). The existence of actualities is not in question. What environment-
induced decoherence does is to quantitatively support the conclusion that
macroscopic objects (as herein defined) exist, by showing that for macro-
scopic objects (as defined by various quantitative models) the probability of
obtaining evidence of departures from classical behavior is extremely low.
This guarantees the abundant existence of macroscopic objects (as herein
defined).
The standard representation of the values of observables by means of
projection operators is not suited to dealing with detectors whose sensi-
tive regions have unsharp boundaries. The appropriate formalism for deal-
ing with such detectors uses positive-operator-valued (POV) measures [43].
Busch and Shimony [44, 45] (see also Ref. [6, Sect. III.6.2]) have shown
that the objectification problem remains unsolvable if POV measures are
used instead of projector-valued ones—unless the pointer observable itself is
unsharp:
in using the general representation of observables as POV mea-
sures, all kinds of inaccuracy have been taken into account—to
the extent they are still compatible with the idea of definite
pointer values. The remaining potential loophole is furnished by
the case of pointer observables which are genuinely unsharp in
that they do not allow for pointer value definiteness. [45]
That pointer observables are unsharp and pointer values indefinite is a direct
consequence of the incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical
world. However, pointers are macroscopic objects, and macroscopic posi-
tions are unsharp only in relation to an imaginary spatiotemporal back-
ground that is more differentiated than the physical world. This is why we
are justified on principled grounds to look on the transition of a pointer from
its neutral position to a value-indicating position as the kind of actual event
without which the quantum-mechanical probability calculus would lack a
domain of application.
In an attempt to make sense of unsharp pointers in the framework that
gives rise to the objectification problem, Mittelstaedt [5, p. 116, original
emphases] conceives of indefinite pointer values as “almost real properties”
and argues that
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Figure 1: Two alternatives. If quantum mechanics instructs us to add their
amplitudes rather than their probabilities, then the straight lines, which
represent transtemporal individuators of some kind, do not correspond to
anything in the physical world.
one has to give up the idea of an objective reality. Indeed, not
only microphysical systems but also macroscopic instruments
and pointers would be in a state of objective undecidedness that
is expressed by the genuine unsharpness of the pointer observ-
ables. Even if the degree of objectification is very high in all prac-
tical cases the observations will always contain a finite amount of
nonobjectivity. . . . The use of genuinely unsharp pointer observ-
ables. . .must not be considered as a means to restore objectivity
and reality in the physical world.
Giving up the idea of an objective reality amounts to giving up the idea
that the quantum-mechanical probability calculus has a domain of appli-
cation. What leads to such self-contradictory expressions as “almost real
properties”, a “degree of objectification”, or an “amount of nonobjectivity”
is the identification of reality/ objectivity with definiteness. Reality and
objectivity do not come in degrees, nor does a pointer position have to be
sharp in order to be real. What is required for it to be objective is that it be
unsharp only in relation to an imaginary spatiotemporal background that is
more differentiated than the physical world.
6 Particles: identity and individuality
Our next order of business is to apply YAIP to alternatives involving distinc-
tions between things. To this end we consider four non-overlapping regions
A, B, C, D, realized by the sensitive regions of four macroscopic detectors.
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Initial measurements (performed at the time t1) indicate the presence of one
particle in A and one particle in B. We wish to calculate the probability p
with which subsequently (at the time t2) one particle is found in C and one
in D. There are two alternatives (Fig. 1). Whenever quantum mechanics
instructs us to add their amplitudes, i.e., p = |A1 + A2|2, the distinction
we make between the alternatives cannot be considered objective, and the
lines connecting the four regions have no counterparts in the physical world.
These lines represent diachronic individuators—either persistent individu-
ating properties or individuating substances. If they cannot be considered
objective, then diachronic individuators do not exist.
Absent diachronic individuators, the particles observed at t1 and the
particles observed at t2 cannot be “snapshots” of things that are distinct
and remain so as time advances from t1 to t2. Are there synchronic in-
dividuators, over and above the different regions containing the particles
at t1 and again at t2? To find out, let us write the initial and final states,
|ψ(t1)〉 and |ψ(t2)〉, as two-particle states. Since the amplitude 〈ψ(t2)|ψ(t1)〉
must come out equal to the sum of the amplitudes A1 = 〈C,D|A,B〉 and
A2 = ±〈D,C|A,B〉, the appropriate two-particle states are
|ψ(t1)〉 = 1√
2
(
|A,B〉 ± |B,A〉
)
, |ψ(t2)〉 = 1√
2
(
|C,D〉 ± |D,C〉
)
. (1)
In other words, we must use (anti)symmetrized two-particle states. If we
were to use |A,B〉 instead of the (anti)symmetrized product, we would in-
troduce, in addition to the physically warranted distinction between “the
particle in A” and “the particle in B,” the physically unwarranted distinc-
tion between the “first” or “left” particle and the “second” or “right” particle
(in the expression |A,B〉). This would be justified if the particles carried
“identity tags” corresponding to “left” and “right,” in which case we would
be required to add probabilities, not amplitudes. If the distinction between
“the particle in A” and “the particle in B” is the only physically warranted
distinction, the distinction between the “left” particle and the “right” par-
ticle must be eliminated, and this is achieved by (anti)symmetrization. The
bottom line is that the absence of diachronic individuators entails the ab-
sence of synchronic individuators.
Quantum mechanics challenges us to think in ways that do not raise
unanswerable questions. If we take for granted that space is an intrinsi-
cally differentiated expanse, we are led to ask the unanswerable question,
“Through which slit did the electron go?” If we take for granted that at
t1 there are two things, and that at t2 there are again two things, we are
led to ask the unanswerable question, “Which is identical with which?” If
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instead we take the view that initially there is one thing present in both A
and B, and that subsequently there is one thing present in both C and D,
this unanswerable question can no longer be asked.
But then the following question arises. Because the two particles seen
at t1 or at t2 lack individuating properties, they can only be numerically
distinct. But are they numerically distinct only because they are observed
in different regions of space? Ordinarily we tend to believe that there is an-
other reason: two qualitatively identical objects situated in non-overlapping
regions of space are numerically distinct because they are individual sub-
stances or, to put it more crudely, because they are made of stuff that can
be parceled out. Yet the two particles, lacking as they do synchronic indi-
viduators, are numerically distinct for the sole reason that they are observed
in different regions of space. Considered without regard to their positions,
they are therefore identical in the strong sense of numerical identity. What
is present in the two regions is one and the same thing—a single entity that
is ontologically anterior to spatial distinctions.
Moreover, the numerical identity of what is present in two regions need
not be confined to so-called identical particles (particles of the same type).
There is no compelling reason to believe that this identity ceases just be-
cause it ceases to have observable consequences when persistent distinguish-
ing characteristics are present. What can be present in different places
(i.e., possess different positions) can also possess different properties other
than position. Nothing therefore stands in the way of the claim that, in
and of itself, each fundamental particle—each particle that lacks internal
structure—is numerically identical with every other fundamental particle.
There is an extensive literature on the subject of identity and individ-
uality in quantum theory. See French [46] for an overview and French and
Krause [47] for a comprehensive review. French sums up the situation by
stating that quantum mechanics is “compatible with two distinct metaphys-
ical ‘packages,’ one in which the particles are regarded as individuals and
one in which they are not.” In other words, there is an underdetermination
between an ontology of quantum objects as individuals and an ontology of
quantum objects as non-individuals. Esfeld [48], however, denies that there
is such an underdetermination because it is not “a serious option to re-
gard quantum objects as possessing a primitive thisness (haecceity) so that
permuting these objects amounts to a real difference.”
What I shall explore in the remainder of this paper is the view (and its
implications for the interpretation of quantum mechanics) that all funda-
mental particles—not only the indistinguishable ones—are identically the
same entity E .
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7 Particles: natural kinds
Classical realism is indebted to two metaphysical assumptions. The first is
that physical objects are substances—independent carriers of primary qual-
ities that can be defined in terms of monadic predicates. The second is that
physical events and processes are completely determined by laws of nature
in accordance with the principle of causality [4, p. 27]. Because the macro-
world effectively conforms to the deterministic correlation laws of classical
physics (except for the unpredictable transitions of value-indicating point-
ers), it lends itself to being described in causal terms. This makes it possible
to sort macroscopic properties into bundles, and to attribute each bundle to
a re-identifiable individual substance.
Two points should be noted here. The first is that the two assump-
tions are not independent. The possibility of sorting properties into bundles
that are attributable to re-identifiable substances, only exists if the laws
of nature are at least effectively deterministic. Because the correlations be-
tween macroscopic positions evince no statistical variations (value-indicating
pointer transitions again excluded), macroscopic objects satisfy this condi-
tion. The second point is that the quantum-mechanical correlation laws
themselves enable us to identify the domain in which causal stories about
independent, re-identifiable objects can be told. What lies “beneath” this
domain, in a sense that will shape up as we proceed, does not conform to
this narrative mode:
quantum mechanics is neither compatible with the traditional
concept of substance (that is, the principle of attributing prop-
erties to property carriers) nor with the principle of causality
in its usual application to individual systems and processes [4,
p. 28].
For Falkenburg this is the reason—“which is hardly recognized in recent
debates on quantum theory” [4, p. 29]—why making physical sense of the
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is so hard.
The question then is: what causes a detector to click? What is clear
right away is that the quantum-mechanical correlation laws cannot provide
the answer. The outcome represented by the span A ∪ B of two orthogonal
subspaces of a Hilbert space (or by the corresponding projector) can be
certain even if neither of the respective outcomes represented by A and B is
certain. If the probabilities assigned to these outcomes are less than 1 while
the probability assigned to A ∪ B is 1, it is certain that either of the two
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outcomes will be found even though neither outcome is certain to be found.
Whence this certainty?
The answer lies in the fact that quantum-mechanical probability assign-
ments are invariably made on the more or less tacit assumption that a mea-
surement is successfully made: there is an outcome. Quantum-mechanical
probabilities are conditional not only because they are assigned on the basis
of actual measurement outcomes but also because they are assigned on the
assumption that an outcome will be obtained. While quantum mechanics
presupposes value-indicating events, its doubly conditional probability as-
signments do not allow us to formulate causally sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of such events [49, 50]. The efficiency of a detector can of course
be measured, but it cannot be calculated from first principles without mak-
ing use of parameters (particularly coupling constants) which themselves
have to be experimentally determined.12
This brings us to the question: what exactly do we speak of when we
speak of a “particle”? For one thing, we do not speak of something that
makes detectors click. If a detector clicks, it is not because a particle has en-
tered its sensitive region. Rather, the click is the reason—one reason—why
the property of being inside the detector’s sensitive region can be attributed
to something which, for want of a better word, we refer to as a “particle.”
Another reason is the existence of conservation laws. If we perform a
series of position measurements, and if each measurement yields exactly one
outcome (i.e., if each time exactly one detector clicks), we have evidence of a
conservation law. If each time exactly two detectors click, we have evidence
of the same conservation law, the conserved quantity being the (maximum)
number of possible simultaneous detector clicks. If this is the only conser-
vation law in force, then we cannot interpret the number of simultaneous
clicks as the number of re-identifiable individuals. What we can infer is the
existence of a single “something” to which a fixed number of positions can
be simultaneously attributed—if and when its positions are measured. If
in addition there are separate conservation laws for different types of clicks
(say, baryon clicks and lepton clicks), then we could infer the existence of two
things each with a fixed number of measurable positions, though it would
clearly make more sense to infer the existence of a single object to which
12Question: If a photon passes a beam splitter, is it not certain to be detected in either
of the beams? Answer: What is certain is that the photon will be detected if each beam
enters a perfect (100% percent efficient) detector. Perfect detectors, however, do not
exist. A statement involving perfect detectors is equivalent to a conditional statement:
the photon will be detected in either beam if a measurement designed to determine the
beam taken by the photon is successfully made.
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a fixed number NB of baryon positions and a fixed number NL of lepton
positions can be simultaneously attributed (if and when its positions are
measured).13
This raises the question: what makes a click of a particular type T (say,
an electron click) a click of type T ? A single click does not announce what
type of particle has been detected. The type to which a detection event
belongs has to be inferred from a sequence of detection events—an optically
recorded sequence of events forming a track in a bubble, cloud, spark, or
streamer chamber, or a sequence of events electronically acquired by using
a wire or drift chamber or a silicon detection system. We classify detection
events according to the type of particle detected, and we classify particles
on the basis of sequences of detection events. A sequence of detection events
makes it possible to measure such quantities as the radius of curvature of
a particle’s track in a magnetic field, a particle’s time of flight, a particle’s
kinetic energy, and a particle’s energy loss through ionization and excitation.
Three of these four measurements are in principle sufficient to positively
identify the particle type [51, Chapter 9], which in turn makes it possible to
classify the individual detection events.14
According to Falkenburg [4], subatomic particles are “collections of em-
pirical properties which constantly go together or bundles of properties
which repeatedly appear together” (p. 221). Their properties “ are tied
together to property bundles with the status of natural kinds” (p. 259). Al-
though these property bundles “are only individuated by the experimental
apparatus in which they are measured or the concrete quantum phenomenon
to which they belong” (p. 206), “there is an entity which appears as a stable
bundle of properties in the phenomena” (p. 259, original emphasis).15
There is indeed something which appears in the phenomena. The ques-
tion is only: is what appears (a) a stable bundle of properties, or is it
(b) something that appears as a stable bundle of properties? If one set of
particles (for example, a probe and a target particle in a high-energy scat-
tering experiment) can be transformed into a different set of particles, the
answer must be (b). What appears is not a natural kind but something
13This argument is for illustrative purposes only. NB and NL are not the (approxi-
mately) conserved baryon and lepton numbers.
14While neutral particles cannot be inferred directly from particle tracks, they can be
inferred indirectly from their interactions with charged particles, on the basis of conser-
vation laws.
15Quarks “appear in the phenomena” in a less direct manner than the other standard-
model fermions. They appear “as dynamically discontinuous constituent parts of localiz-
able bound systems” [4, p. 262].
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that appears now as one set of particles (i.e., tokens of natural kinds) and
subsequently as another such set. What appears is that single entity E intro-
duced in the previous section, which can be present now under the form of
two tokens of the natural kinds TA and TB , respectively, located in regions A
and B, and subsequently under the form of two tokens of the natural kinds
TC and TD, respectively, located in regions C and D.
8 Particles: localizability
Hegerfeldt [7, 8, 9] has shown that in a relativistic quantum theory super-
luminal spreading of wave functions must occur if (i) there are states with
localized particles and (ii) there is a lower bound on the system’s energy.
(A particle is said to be localized at t0 if it is prepared in such a way as to
ensure that it will be found with probability 1, by a measurement performed
at t0, within a finite region of space.) The conclusion is that it is impossible
to localize a particle even for an instant.
Malament [10] has proved a theorem which establishes that in relativistic
quantum mechanics particles cannot be completely localized in spatial re-
gions with sharp boundaries. Clifton and Halvorson [11] have strengthened
Malament’s result by deriving a theorem which shows that there is no rela-
tivistic quantum mechanics of unsharply localized particles either. Quantum
theory engenders a fundamental conflict between relativistic causality and
localizability, so that particle talk is “strictly fictional”:
The argument for localizable particles appears to be very simple:
Our experience shows us that objects (particles) occupy finite
regions of space. But the reply to this argument is just as simple:
These experiences are illusory! Although no object is strictly
localized in a bounded region of space, an object can be well-
enough localized to give the appearance to us (finite observers)
that it is strictly localized.
What Hegerfeldt, Malament, and Clifton and Halvorson have established is
analogous in some respects to the non-objectification theorems proved by
Mittelstaedt [5, Sect. 4.3(b)] and the insolubility theorem for the objectifi-
cation problem due to Busch et al. [6, Sect. III.6.2]. While non-relativistic
quantum mechanics cannot account for the measurement outcomes which it
presupposes and serves to correlate, relativistic quantum field theory can-
not account for the particle detections which it presupposes and serves to
correlate. The latter theory provides us with conditional statements of the
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following form: if a set of particles Pi with momenta pi come together in a
scattering event, then such is the probability with which a set of particles Qk
with momenta qk will emerge from the event. The theory requires that in-
states be prepared and out-states be observed, but it leaves the operational
implementation to the experimenters. Experimenters use a generalized ver-
sion of Bohr’s correspondence principle to identify these states with the
particle types and momenta they obtain by analyzing particle tracks, and it
is these data that the theory serves to correlate.16
Whether or not particles are localizable depends on our answer to the
question: localizable relative to what? The most basic axiom of field theory—
so basic that it is rarely explicitly stated—postulates the existence of a
spatiotemporal manifold M. What Hegerfeldt, Malament, and Clifton and
Halvorson have shown is that a particle cannot be in a state in which the
probability of finding it within any finite spatial region of M equals 1. M,
however, is not where experiments are performed. The possible outcomes of
position measurements are not defined relative to a completely differentiated
spatial background. Attributable positions are defined by the sensitive re-
gions of detectors, which also cannot be localized in any finite spatial region
of M. What is strictly fictional, therefore, is the spacetime manifold pos-
tulated by quantum field theory. What Clifton and Halvorson have shown
is not that there are no localizable particles but that this manifold is not
localizable relative to the positions that particles can possess.
9 The shapes of things
According to Ladyman and Ross [12, p. 4], “it is no longer helpful to con-
ceive of either the world, or particular systems of the world that we study in
partial isolation, as ‘made of’ anything at all.” I agree. If things are made
of anything at all, they are made of a single entity E , which is both onto-
16According to Falkenburg [4, p. XII], “quantum mechanics and quantum field theory
only refer to individual systems due to the ways in which the quantum models of matter
and subatomic interactions are linked by semi-classical models to the classical models
of subatomic structure and scattering processes. All these links are based on tacit use
of a generalized correspondence principle in Bohr’s sense (plus other unifying principles
of physics).” This generalized correspondence principle, due to Heisenberg [52], serves
as “a semantic principle of continuity which guarantees that the predicates for physical
properties such as ‘position’, ‘momentum’, ‘mass’, ‘energy’, etc., can also be defined in
the domain of quantum mechanics, and that one may interpret them operationally in
accordance with classical measurement methods. It provides a great many inter-theoretical
relations, by means of which the formal concepts and models of quantum mechanics can
be filled with physical meaning” [4, p. 191].
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logically anterior to and capable of entertaining reflexive spatial relations.
The interesting question is not what things are made of but what forms are
made of. Forms are made of (reflexive) spatial relations, or so I shall now
argue.
The idea most commonly associated with the concept of a spatial form
is that of a boundary. It is closely related to the concept of matter in
ancient philosophy, which gave rise to the conundrum about the divisibility
of matter by cutting, i.e., by introducing delimiting surfaces. (The literal
meaning of the Greek word atomos is “uncuttable.”) This idea, moreover,
appears to have neurobiological underpinnings. The manner in which the
brain appears to process visual information guarantees that the result—the
visual world—is a world of objects whose shapes are bounding surfaces [32,
33, 53]. The tension of contrast between shapes qua (definite) bounding
surfaces and shapes qua sets of (more or less indefinite) spatial relations
is perhaps the most overlooked significant difference between classical and
quantum conceptions of reality.
Classically conceived, the shapes of things resolve themselves into the
shapes of their constituents and the spatial relations between them. Since
classical relativity rules out the existence of rigid bodies, the constituents
have to be either elastic or pointlike. If elasticity is understood in terms of
variable distances between constituents, there must be ultimate constituents,
and they must be pointlike.
Fundamental particles are often said to be pointlike, but not in the
same classical sense, or else for the wrong reason. A particle is said to
be pointlike if it lacks internal structure.17 A particle’s lack of internal
structure can be inferred from the scale-invariance of its effective cross-
section(s) in scattering experiments with probe particles that are themselves
pointlike (in this sense). Since spatial structures are not measurable below
the de Broglie wavelength of the probe particles, no scattering experiment
can provide evidence of absence of internal structure, let alone evidence of
a literally pointlike form.
A more insidious reason for conceiving of particles as pointlike is rooted
in the fact that relativistic conservation laws must be local. To ensure that
17It may be asked whether there are particles that are fundamental in this sense. In
1998, the Elementary-Particle Physics Panel of the U.S. National Research Council [54,
p. 23] stated that “[t]he question is still open experimentally, but theory and experiment
are pointing more than ever before to the possibility that we have discovered the ‘ultimate
constituents’.” As recently as 2013, Nicolai [55] affirms that “there is not a shred of a
hint so far that would point to an extended structure of the fundamental constituents of
matter (quarks, leptons and gauge bosons).”
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for every conserved quantity the total associated with the incoming parti-
cles in a scattering experiment equals the total associated with the outgoing
particles, the conserved quantities must “flow locally” from the incoming
particles to the outgoing particles. If scattering amplitudes are calculated
using Feynman diagrams in position space, the locality of this flow is guar-
anteed by the unbroken lines representing propagators and the pointlike
aspect of the vertices at which they meet. A literal physical interpretation
of these computational aids may then lead to the conclusion that particles
interact with each other only when they are in the same place, i.e., when
their positions relative to each other are sharp.
Transition amplitudes, however, tell us nothing about what actually
takes place during a transition, be it an atomic transition or the transi-
tion from a given set of in-states to a given set of out-states.18 We may
conceive of a perturbation expansion as a sum over all possible ways in
which a transition can take place, but the very fact that we sum amplitudes
associated with distinct graphs implies (via YAIP) that the distinctions we
make between the graphs cannot be considered objective. (The same applies
to the propagators, which are sums over spacetime paths,19 and to the ver-
tices, which are integrated over spacetime, and thus as non-local as it gets.)
Because the distinctions we make between the alternatives represented by
the graphs cannot be considered objective, the alternatives act as one, giv-
ing rise to collective effects like the Lamb shift, the masses of nucleons, or
the momentum-dependence of masses and coupling parameters.
In sum, the idea that a fundamental particle is a literally pointlike object
is unwarranted on both theoretical and experimental grounds. In addition,
it is inconsistent with the incomplete spatial differentiation of the physical
world, inasmuch as it would imply that something is present at some x while
nothing is present in the infinitesimal neighborhood of x, which is possible
only in a world that is spatially differentiated “all the way down.” Nothing
therefore stands in the way of the claim that a fundamental particle is a
literally formless object; on the contrary, everything speaks for it.
One conclusion reached in Sect. 4 was that if we think of space as a
18“The S-matrix. . . gives transition probabilities which correspond to measurable rel-
ative frequencies. But it treats the scattering itself as a black box. . . . Feynman dia-
grams. . . have no literal meaning. They are mere iconic representations of the perturba-
tion expansion of a quantum field theory. They make the calculations easier, but they do
not represent individual physical processes.” [4, p. 131–132]
19In field theories, the sums over spacetime paths are implicit in the representation of
particles by fields, inasmuch as the fields are solutions of the dynamical equations one
obtains by summing over spacetime paths.
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substantial expanse, we must think of it as undifferentiated. If fundamental
particles are formless, a different conception of physical space suggests itself.
The notion of a literally pointlike object entails the existence of a spatial
expanse in which it is situated. If there are no pointlike objects, there
is no need to conceive of such an expanse. Space may be conceived as
containing—in the set-theoretic sense of containment—nothing but spatial
relations, the relata being formless objects and “composites” thereof. Being
spatially extended would then be not a property of a substantial expanse
but a quality shared by all spatial relations. If we adopt this conception of
space, the truism that the universe lacks a position because it lacks external
spatial relations acquires a fitting complement: a fundamental particle lacks
a form because it lacks internal spatial relations.
This patently relationist conception of space goes farther in relationism—
the doctrine that space and time are a family of spatial and temporal re-
lations holding among the material constituents of the universe—in that it
also affirms that the “ultimate” material constituents are formless. If space
consists of relations between formless relata, the latter are not contained in
space. What makes it possible for them to be detected at different locations
is the spatial relations that hold among them. This makes it possible to go
farther still and assert that, in and of itself, each fundamental particle is nu-
merically identical with E , and thus with every other fundamental particle,
so that the relations that hold between fundamental particles are reflexive.20
The form defined by a set of spatial relations is an abstract concept.
The form of a bipartite object—for instance that of a hydrogen atom if the
proton’s structure is ignored—consists of a single relative position r. It can
be described by a probability distribution over the possible outcomes of a
measurement of r. If we have measured, say, the atom’s energy, its total
angular momentum, and one component of its angular momentum, then we
know how to calculate this probability distribution. (Since this description
does not assume that the measurement is actually made, we need not be
overly worried by the nonexistence of suitable detectors.)
The form of an object with N > 2 components consists of N(N−1)/2
spatial relations. While the positions of N−1 components relative to the
20Those who wish to conceive of space (or spacetime) as a self-existent expanse may
do so—on condition that they conceive of it as undifferentiated. What is differentiated
is its material “content.” Because this is not differentiated all the way down, the multi-
plicity inherent in the set-theoretic conception of space (or spacetime) cannot be consid-
ered objective. In other words, while substantivalism with regard to an undifferentiated
spatiotemporal expanse is defensible, substantivalism with regard to a set-theoretically
conceived “continuum” is not.
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remaining component can be described with the help of a single probability
distribution over a 3(N−1)-dimensional abstract space, the relative posi-
tions between these N−1 components can only be described in terms of
correlations between the outcomes of measurements of their positions.
The abstractly defined forms of nucleons (bound states of quarks), nu-
clei (bound states of nucleons), atoms (bound states of nuclei and electrons),
and molecules (bound states of atoms) “exist” in probability spaces of in-
creasingly higher dimensions. At the molecular level of complexity, however,
an entirely different kind of form comes into being: a 3-dimensional form
that can be visualized, not as a distribution over a 3-dimensional probability
space, like the abstract form of a hydrogen atom in a stationary state, but
as it is. I am of course speaking of the atomic configurations of molecules.
What contributes to making these configurations visualizable is that the in-
definiteness of the distance d between any pair of bonded atoms, as measured
by the standard deviation of the corresponding probability distribution, is
significantly smaller in general than the mean value of d.
If classical properties or behaviors emerge, it is not from some mystical
domain of potentialities, nor by a dynamical process, but in the concep-
tual transition from the compositionally simple to the complex. If there
is a quantum-classical boundary, it is molecules that straddle it. There is
something on the classical side, to wit, their atomic configurations, which
change slowly, while the electron wave functions follow adiabatically. Only
molecules consisting of very few atoms are known to occur in energy and
angular momentum eigenstates [2, p. 99].
It is now widely recognized that environmental decoherence [1, 2, 3]
contributes significantly to the emergence of classicality at the molecular
level. Decoherence induced by the scattering of particles—dust grains, air
molecules, thermal and microwave photons, even solar neutrinos—is seen
as responsible for, inter alia, the handedness of sugar molecules, the par-
ity of ammonia molecules, the definite orientations of larger molecules, and
the tertiary structures of DNA-molecules and proteins. It should be borne
in mind, though, that decoherence only results in a quantum system’s get-
ting entangled with the environment; the resulting mixed state does not
admit of an ignorance interpretation—unless “environment” stands for the
macroworld. While the indefiniteness of a system observable can infect its
microscopic environment, giving rise to (synchronic) correlations between
the possible outcomes of measurements performed on the system and this
environment, it cannot infect the macroworld, for if it did, there would be
no measurement outcomes, we could not speak of correlations between mea-
surement outcomes, and the term “entanglement” would be undefined. If,
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on the other hand, the environment includes the macroworld, or if “envi-
ronment” stands for it, what happens instead is that the definiteness of the
macroworld reproduces itself in the genuinely quantum domain.
This spreading of macroscopic definiteness into the genuinely quantum
domain is what makes it possible to extrapolate the classical understanding
of objects in terms of interacting parts to about the scale of large molec-
ular structures, as any textbook of molecular biology amply demonstrates.
Below this scale, descriptions in terms of composition and parts go astray,
inasmuch as there the “parts” lose their separate identities, and the state
of a “composite” object generally ceases to be determined by the states of
its “parts.” (Whenever a pure state can be assigned to a composite ob-
ject, state separability fails, either because pure states cannot be assigned
to the parts, or because the density operators of the parts do not uniquely
determine the density operator of the whole.)
10 An apparent logical circle
If kinematical properties are attributable to microphysical objects only if
(and when) their possession is indicated by macroscopic objects, then the
popular notion that macroscopic objects are made up of microphysical ones
leads to a vicious circle. To resolve it, we need not abandon the view that
microphysical objects contribute to a macroscopic object’s being what it is.
We only need to understand how microphysical objects contribute to—what
role they play in—making a macroscopic object what it is.
One of the salient differences between classical and quantum accounts
is that the latter interpose an extra level of description between a physical
system and its properties. A classical system can be described in terms
of properties that exist whether or not their presence is indicated by mea-
surements. Quantum systems, by contrast, are described (a) in terms of
correlations between the possible outcomes of measurements (irrespective of
whether they are made) and (b) by the outcomes of measurements that are
made.
When a particle or atom is described in isolation, it is described in terms
of (diachronic) correlations between outcomes of measurements to which the
particle or atom can be subjected. An electron in isolation is described by
an irreducible representation of a symmetry group, which defines a propa-
gator or a dynamical equation, which defines correlations between detection
events. Strictly speaking, this is a description not of the natural kind electron
but of the natural kind electron in isolation. While this description involves
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no actual measurements and does not individualize, it makes it possible to
identify electrons by identifying particle tracks as electron tracks. It is the
electron tracks that individualize, and that make it possible to attribute to
the individual electron both a sequence of more or less definite positions
and a sequence of more or less definite momenta (by connecting successive
detection events).
When electrons are among the so-called constituents of an atom or a
molecule, on the other hand, we are no longer dealing with the natural
kind electron in isolation. Such electrons are not individualized, nor can
kinematical properties be attributed to them (since none are measured).
It is the isolated atom or molecule that then is described (a) in terms of
(diachronic) correlations between the possible outcomes of measurements
to which it can be subjected (irrespective of whether they are made) and
(b) by the outcomes of measurements that are made. But if electrons need no
kinematical properties to contribute to making an isolated atom or molecule
what it is, they need no kinematical properties to contribute to making a
macroscopic object what it is. Hence, no vicious circle ensues.
A circularity exists, but it is revealing rather than vicious. Landau and
Lifshitz [56, p. 3] point to it when they observe that “quantum mechan-
ics. . . contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same time it
requires this limiting case for its own formulation.” So does Redhead [57] in
stating this implication of the Copenhagen interpretation: “In a sense the
reduction instead of descending linearly towards the elementary particles,
moves in a circle, linking the reductive basis back to the higher levels.”
In resisting attempts at explaining things in compositional terms, i.e., by
explaining the unity of a whole in terms of a multiplicity of parts, quantum
mechanics calls for an explanatory concept that proceeds in the opposite
direction: from the unity of an intrinsically undifferentiated entity E to the
multiplicity of the macroworld, by means of an atemporal process of dif-
ferentiation. If there is a distinctly quantum domain, it is not a domain
of constituent objects with intrinsic properties but a domain in which—or,
rather, an aspatial and atemporal dimension across which—this transition
from unity to multiplicity takes place. While atoms and subatomic particles
are instrumental in this transition, their instrumentality cannot be under-
stood in compositional terms. Ultimately there is but one constituent, to
wit, E .
One can arrive at this conclusion by observing that the properties of the
macroworld allow themselves to be bundled into separate objects only up to
a point, and that physical space likewise allows itself to be partitioned into
disjoint regions only up to a point. If we go on dividing a material object,
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we reach a point where the distinctions we make between component parts
cease to correspond to anything real, a point where the “component parts”
become identical in the strong sense of numerical identity (Sect. 6). And if
we keep partitioning physical space, we reach a point where the distinctions
we make between regions of space cease to correspond to anything real, a
point where physical space becomes an intrinsically undifferentiated expanse
(Sect. 4). We are free to think not only of that which every fundamental
particles intrinsically is but also of this intrinsically undifferentiated expanse
as aspects of E . By entering into reflexive spatial relations, E gives rise to
(i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata whenever the reflexive quality
of the relations is not taken into account, and to (ii) what looks like a
substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified.
On the way from the unity of E to the macroworld we encounter increas-
ingly differentiated structures such as identical particles, non-visualizable
atoms, and partly visualizable molecules. We encounter systems that are
described in terms of correlations across probability spaces of increasingly
higher dimensions. At the molecular level of differentiation, macroworld-
induced decoherence gains traction, and (the physical aspect of) what Sell-
ars [58] has called “the manifest image of the world” comes into view.
The previously mentioned (revealing rather than vicious) circularity en-
sues because the transition from unity to multiplicity goes through stages of
increasing definiteness and distinguishability. To describe what is indefinite
and indistinguishable, we resort to probability distributions over events that
are definite and distinguishable, and such events only exists in the macro-
world. What is instrumental in the transition can only be described in terms
of the final result, the macroworld.
11 Manifestation
We need a name for this new explanatory concept—this transition from
unity to multiplicity across an aspatial and atemporal dimension, this self-
differentiation of E through the adoption of reflexive spatial relations—and
Sellars’s distinction between the manifest and scientific images of the world
suggest what it should be.
For Sellars [58], the manifest image is, broadly speaking, the framework
in terms of which we ordinarily explain our world (including ourselves). It
seeks to establish the correlations that we observe, without trying to explain
them in terms of the theoretical postulates of scientific theories. While the
manifest image thus is devoid of the theoretical posits that populate the
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scientific image, the scientific image, according to Sellars, lacks the “cat-
egories pertaining to man as a person,” such as intentions, thoughts, and
appearances.
To make a distinction between the two images, however, it is not neces-
sary to bring up issues pertaining to the philosophy of mind. The distinction
can also be made in the inanimate world, as illustrated by Eddington’s two
tables [59, pp. ix–x]. The relevance of Sellars’s distinction to the interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics was noted by Maudlin [60]:
Insofar as one uses quantum theory to construct a Scientific Im-
age of the world, that Image will include a wave function. Fur-
ther, if everything that exists must be represented in the Scien-
tific Image, then there should be a wave-function of everything,
i.e., of the whole universe. Now suppose that the wave function
is all there is in the Scientific Image (i.e., suppose the wave func-
tion is complete). And suppose further that the wave function
never collapses. Then it is very difficult to see how to make con-
tact between the Scientific and Manifest Images of the world.
As is famously illustrated by the example of Schro¨dinger’s cat,
the wave function’s behavior is not even loosely isomorphic to
the Manifest behavior of the cat. The Scientific Image must be
amended or expanded if we are to find some doppelga¨nger of the
Manifest Image in it.
According to Maudlin, the fundamental interpretive problem is exactly the
problem of connecting the scientific image with the manifest. It seems evi-
dent that the points of contact must be positions—the definite positions of
things in the manifest image and the positions of certain quantum objects
in the scientific. If we wanted to identify the momenta of manifest things
with the momenta of certain quantum objects, we would not know where to
begin. As Maudlin observes, there is “simply no obvious way to sketch any
isomorphism between a world of particles which only have momentum and
the world as we experience it.”
I have argued for a way to amend a misconceived scientific image, a way
that rejects two extreme solutions of the fundamental interpretive problem—
a radical empiricism or metaphysically sterile instrumentalism on one hand,
and on the other the reification of the wave function and/or of the spacetime
points on which it functionally depends. The empiricist is right in that quan-
tum states are probability algorithms, the instrumentalist is right in that the
quantum-mechanical probability calculus serves to correlate value-indicating
34
events, but both are wrong when they assert that correlations between ob-
servations or macro-events are all there is. There is this single, intrinsically
undifferentiated entity E , which enters into indefinite and reflexive spatial
relations. There are the quantum-mechanical correlation laws, which to-
gether with these relations give rise to structures such as atoms, which are
instrumental in manifesting (i.e., making manifest) a world of macroscopic
objects, whose positions are real per se. Realists would be right in posit-
ing these things but they are wrong in transmogrifying calculational tools
into physical states evolving in an intrinsically and completely differentiated
spacetime.
By claiming that the macroworld results from a self-differentiation of E ,
or that E manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive relations, I
posit a so far unrecognized kind of causality—unrecognized, I believe, within
the scientific literature albeit well-known to metaphysics, for the general
philosophical pattern of a single world-essence manifesting itself as a multi-
plicity of physical individuals is found throughout the world. Some of its rep-
resentatives in the Western hemisphere are the Neoplatonists, John Scottus
Eriugena, and the German idealists. The quintessential Eastern example is
the original (pre-illusionist) Vedanta of the Upanishads [61, 62]. This under-
stands the world as the manifestation of an ultimate reality, which is related
to its manifestation in three mutually irreducible ways: as its constituent
substance, as its containing consciousness, and as a pure quality/delight as
yet undifferentiated into its subjective and objective aspects.21
To my mind, the Vedantic world conception in particular offers a promis-
ing framework for a full resolution of the tension between the scientific and
manifest images, in the broader sense intended by Sellars. After all, if the
world is manifested by something or someone, it is also manifested to some-
thing or someone. The Vedantic concept of manifestation both implies a
duality of mind and matter and transcends it, inasmuch as that by which
the world is manifested is ultimately one with that to which the world is
manifested.22 Needless to say, a discussion of this identity and of what it
entails far exceeds the scope of the present paper [63].23
21Sri Aurobindo [62, 63] offers a detailed account of how that ultimate reality comes to
take on these essential aspects.
22“Hence I am God Almighty,” Schro¨dinger concludes in the Epilogue to his classic,
What is Life? [64], in which he makes explicit reference to Vedanta and the Upanishads.
23I venture, however, to say this much: Ever since Leibniz, philosophers have argued
that all physical properties are relational or extrinsic, and none are in a fundamental sense
non-relational or intrinsic. As was pointed out by Russell [65], this offers the possibility of
locating the “categories pertaining to man as a person” [58] in the intrinsic properties of
the relata that bear the relational physical properties. It also makes it possible to think
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If the spatiotemporal differentiation of the world is incomplete, and if,
as a consequence, the interpretation of quantum states as evolving physical
states is ruled out, then the causality of the atemporal process of manifesta-
tion is the only kind of causality that is applicable to the distinctly quantum
domain. Because the quantum-mechanical correlation laws are (effectively)
deterministic only within the macroworld, the temporal concept of causa-
tion, which links states or events across time or spacetime, has meaningful
application only in the macroworld.24 It plays no role in its manifestation.
It is part of the world drama, but it does not take part in setting the stage
for it.25
The causality of the atemporal process of manifestation also has tele-
ological aspects. It manifests a world—the macroworld—whose proper-
ties allow themselves to be sorted into (causally) evolving bundles of re-
identifiable individual substances. This opens the door to “anthropic” ar-
guments [66, 67, 68]. What does it take to manifest such a world? At a
minimum, such a world must contain objects that have spatial extent and
are (relatively) stable [20]. To manifest such objects by means of finite num-
bers of spatial relations (both relative positions and relative orientations),
these relations (as well as the corresponding relative momenta) have to be
indefinite, uncertainty relations must hold, the relata have to be fermions,
and there are further conditions that must be satisfied [69, Chapters 8 and
22].
The question then is, how do we deal with indefinite observables in a rig-
orous manner? We do so by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes
of measurements of such observables. This is why the irreducible empiri-
cal core of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus. And how are the
possible outcomes defined? They are defined by macroscopic instruments
(Sect. 4). By realizing properties, a measurement apparatus makes prop-
of ultimate reality’s essential aspect of quality/delight as the intrinsic nature of E . A case
can therefore be made for a reversal of metaphysical reductionism: what matters meta-
physically is first and foremost what is manifested, or what the manifest image contains;
particles are but means to manifest it (and so, presumably, are brains).
24Ladyman and Ross [12, pp. 258, 280] concur: “the idea of causation has similar status
to those of cohesion, forces, and things. It is a concept that structures the notional worlds
of observers. . . . Appreciating the role of causation in this notional world is crucial to
understanding the nature of the special sciences, and the general ways in which they differ
from fundamental physics. . . . There is no justification for the neo-scholastic projection of
causation all the way down to fundamental physics and metaphysics.”
25One should also bear in mind that quantum theory’s doubly conditional probability
assignments do not allow us to formulate causally sufficient conditions for value-indicating
events (Sect. 7). While the indicated values of observables (as well as the times at which
they are possessed) can be considered objective, causal relations between them cannot.
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erties available for attribution, and by indicating a particular outcome, it
warrants the attribution of a particular property. This is why the events to
which quantum mechanics assigns probabilities are measurement outcomes.
In short, the manifestation of a world in which causal stories about inde-
pendent, re-identifiable objects can be told, entails the validity of something
very much like quantum mechanics.
What more does the manifestation of a world which conforms to the
classical narrative mode entail concerning the laws and the natural kinds or
structures that are instrumental in its manifestation? If one also requires
that quantum theory be discoverable and/or testable (without necessarily re-
quiring that anyone be around to discover and/or test it), then a case can be
made that all of the four empirically known “forces” are needed [20, 69, 70].
The strong force (QCD) results in particles of different types: three types
of colored quark and eight types of gluon. These give rise to a first layer of
bound states (hadrons), among them the nucleons, which give rise to a sec-
ond layer of bound states (atomic nuclei). Adding the weak force (necessary
for stellar nucleosynthesis and the release of nuclei heavier than helium into
the interstellar medium) amounts to multiplying the quark types by two
(flavors) and to introducing another fermion doublet (the leptons) as well
as three vector bosons.26 Adding the electric force (QED) by introducing
the photon and attributing electric charges to quarks, electrons, and two
vector bosons gives rise to another two layers of bound states (atoms and
molecules), and adding gravity produces a final layer of (gravitationally)
bound states. If the “stagflation” of theoretical particle physics since the
mid-1970’s is an indication, it is difficult in the extreme to come up with
something that beats the economy of the standard model27 plus general
relativity in accounting for the existence of a world that conforms to the
classical narrative mode.
It may be instructive to compare the manifestation of the macroworld
with the classical philosophical concept of the emergence of the Many out
of a One. In classical philosophy, this emergence was conceived as run-
ning parallel to predication: an immaterial essence or predicable universal
becomes instantiated as an impredicable material individual. This instanti-
ation, moreover, was conceived in the framework of a Platonic-Aristotelian
dualism, which postulates an instantiating medium (matter and/or space) in
or by which the essences or universals get instantiated.28 The manifestation
26Why there are 3× 2 flavors remains something of a mystery.
27According to Wilczek [71, p. 164], “Standard model is a grotesquely modest name for
one of humankind’s greatest achievements.”
28Ladyman and Ross [12, p. 155] ask their readers “to consider whether the main meta-
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of the macroworld, by contrast, requires no separate medium and implies no
dualism. All that is required is the realization of spatial relations. E may
be said to manifest the macroworld within itself—after all, the macroworld
is manifested with the help of reflexive relations—rather than in something
other than itself.
In her highly commendable book Particle Metaphysics [4], a wholesome
antidote to mathematical literalism from which I have quoted several times,
Brigitte Falkenburg defends a relational account of subatomic reality result-
ing from a top-down approach:
The opposite bottom-up explanation of the classical macroscopic
world in terms of electrons, light quanta, quarks, and some other
particles remains an empty promise. Any attempt at construct-
ing a particle or field ontology gives rise to a non-relational ac-
count of a subatomic reality made up of independent substances
and causal agents. But any known approach of this type is either
at odds with the principles of relativistic quantum theory or with
the assumption that quantum measurements give rise to actual
events in a classical world. As long as the quantum measurement
problem is unresolved, an independent quantum reality is simply
not available. (p. 339)
How does Falkenburg’s relational top-down account differ from that pro-
posed by the present author? We both reject bottom-up explanations, and
we both have, consequently, characterized our respective approaches as being
“top-down,” albeit in different senses. For Falkenburg, the macroworld is on
top, and the downward direction indicates the epistemological dependence
on it of subatomic reality:
to our present knowledge subatomic reality is not a micro-world
on its own but a part of empirical reality that exists relative to
the macroscopic world, in given experimental arrangements and
well-defined physical contexts outside the laboratory. (p. 340)
The view put forward in the present paper puts on top a single, self-
differentiating yet intrinsically undifferentiated entity E , and the downward
direction indicates the atemporal process of self-differentiation by means of
indefinite and reflexive spatial relations. This view does not conflict with
physical idea we propose, of existent structures that are not composed out of more basic
entities, is any more obscure or bizarre than the instantiation relation in the theory of
universals.” It is not.
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Falkenburg’s account but rather complements it. As I see it, the relation
between the macroworld and subatomic reality is not merely a one-way epis-
temological relation. It is this, inasmuch as we appear to have no choice but
to describe what is instrumental in the process of manifestation in terms of
its final outcome, the macroworld. But in addition to this epistemological
dependence I infer (or postulate) an ontological dependence of the macro-
world on E , in which subatomic reality plays an instrumental role.
In the passage just quoted Falkenburg states that no independent quan-
tum reality is available as long as the quantum measurement problem is
unresolved. Nor has such a reality been made available by the resolution of
the problem in Sects. 2 through 4. Subatomic reality’s epistemological de-
pendence on the macroworld remains, and although an independent reality
has become available, it is not a reality made up of independent substances
and causal agents. On the contrary, applying the concepts of substance and
causality to a micro-world on its own would put the cart in front of the horse,
for it is the quantum-mechanical correlation laws that tell us where these
concepts have meaningful application. Instead of playing an instrumental
role in the manifestation of the macroworld, these concepts have meaningful
application only within the macroworld.
12 Relations all the way down?
Today structural realism is considered by many to be the most defensible
form of scientific realism [72]. The epistemic structural realist holds that
all we can know is structure, but it is the structure of an unknowable realm
of individuals and their intrinsic natures. In the view of Ladyman and
Ross [12], the naturalistic stance entails that talk of unknowable individuals
and intrinsic natures is idle metaphysics. Ontic structural realism (OSR),
introduced by French and Ladyman [73], holds that relational structure is
ontologically subsistent and prior to individual objects. It is ontologically
fundamental in the sense of not supervening on the intrinsic properties of in-
dividuals. Quantum particles are contextually individuated: they are nodes
in networks of relations. In so far as they are individuals, it is the relations
among them that account for this.
This radical version of OSR runs counter to the widely held view that
relations presuppose numerical diversity and thus cannot account for it.
Esfeld and Lam (EL in what follows) [13, 14] regard quantum mechanics as
supporting a moderate version of OSR that does not waive the commitment
to objects. While both versions of OSR deny that objects have an intrinsic
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identity (constituted by intrinsic properties or a primitive thisness), the
moderate version accepts numerical distinctness as primitive and denies that
objects are reducible to relations. Instead, objects and relations imply each
other: objects can neither exist nor be conceived without relations that hold
between them, and relations can neither exist in the physical world nor be
conceived as the structure of the physical world without objects that bear
the relations.
The claim that structure is all there is leaves open how the structure
is implemented, instantiated, or realized in the physical world. What is it
that is structured? Ladyman and Ross [12, p. 158] advocate a kind of neo-
positivism according to which when questions like this arise it is time to stop:
“In our view, there is nothing more to be said about this that doesn’t amount
to empty words. . . . The ‘world-structure’ just is and exists independently of
us and we represent it mathematico-physically via our theories.” Esfeld [48],
by contrast, insists that if OSR is to be a complete realism, it must specify
how the structure in question is implemented. Otherwise it only provides
a general scheme for an ontology of the physical domain, without spelling
out a particular ontology, just as quantum mechanics does in the absence
of a specific interpretation. Esfeld therefore suggests that OSR should be
seen not as itself providing a complete ontology but as a possible guiding
principle in the search for a quantum ontology. Apparently, though, its
use as a guiding principle is limited, for, having examined some of the more
popular interpretations, Esfeld concludes that none of them is in any obvious
way compliant with OSR.
Esfeld’s demand of completeness is something of a catch-22. If structure
is ontologically subsistent and fundamental, OSR is incomplete in that it
does not explain why the structure in question is physical and not just
mathematical. And if a complete realism explains this, OSR cannot be a
complete structural realism since the physical realization of a given structure
cannot be achieved by positing more structure, just as an interpretation of
quantum mechanics cannot be achieved by writing down another formula.
The radical and the moderate ontic structural realist both appear unable
or unwilling to recognize that the quantum world is structured in two dis-
tinct ways: there are (i) the definite spatial relations between macroscopic
objects, which are real per se, and there are (ii) the indefinite and reflexive
spatial relations, which are instrumental in the manifestation of macroscopic
objects, and which are described in terms of correlations between the possi-
ble outcomes of measurements. Thus EL [13] declare that the laws of physics
“describe relations among physical objects, and only relations, but without
relations of measurement having a special status.”
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Failing to recognize the difference between the two structures, along with
the role that measurements play in rendering them distinct, the proponents
of OSR fail to make further necessary distinctions, such as the distinction
between relations and correlations. Thus Ladyman and Ross [12, p. 137]
attribute to a pair of fermions in the singlet state “the relation ‘is of oppo-
site spin to’.” This categorical statement is clearly false, for if the spins of
the two particles are measured with respect to axes that are neither par-
allel nor antiparallel, they will not point in opposite directions. All that
is warranted is conditional statements expressing (synchronic) correlations
between possible measurement outcomes.
EL [13], for their part, having proposed that “physical structures are
networks of concrete, qualitative physical relations among objects that are
nothing but what stands in these relations. . . ,” go on to state that “the cor-
relata are nothing but that what stands in the correlations,” as if relations
and correlations were interchangeable items. The correlata are not nothing
but what stands in the relations; they are events indicating the possession
of a property (by a system) or a value (by an observable). The relata are in-
deed numerically distinct only on account of the relations that hold between
them—their relative positions and orientations and the corresponding rel-
ative momenta—but intrinsically “they” are numerically identical and not
nothing but what stands in concrete, qualitative physical relations.
As far as quantum mechanics is concerned, OSR has been predicated on
two features of the theory: the indiscernibility of particles of the same type
and the failure of state separability in the case of entangled systems: whereas
the quantum state of the whole system uniquely determines the states of its
subsystems (i.e., their density operators), the latter do not uniquely deter-
mine the quantum state of the whole system. Both features are on display in
EPR-Bohm experiments [74, pp. 611–622], in which “there is no fact of the
matter which one of the two quantum objects prepared in the singlet state
at the source of an EPR-Bohm experiment is later measured in the left wing
and which one is measured in the right wing of the experiment” [48]. EL [14]
interpret the failure of state separability as a violation of “a cornerstone of
atomism in the philosophy of nature,” namely the principle of separability
according to which the relations between objects (other than spatiotemporal
relations) supervene on the intrinsic properties of objects:
instead of the intrinsic properties of the parts fixing the relations
among them and thus the state of the whole, only the state
of the whole fixes the relations among the parts, namely the
superpositions of correlations that characterize entangled states.
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Whence EL [13] conclude that we “cannot but take as fundamental the joint
state of the whole, in the last resort the joint state of the whole world,” and
that “the entangled states are the ways (modes) in which the quantum
objects exist.”
These conclusions evince the lack of three necessary distinctions: the dis-
tinction between relations and correlations, the distinction between states
qua sets of possessed properties and states qua probability algorithms, and
the distinction between the supervenience of relations on properties and the
supervenience of probability algorithms associated with composite systems
on probability algorithms associated with component systems, which fails if
the component systems are entangled. What is violated is not the principle
that the relations between objects ought to supervene on the intrinsic prop-
erties of objects, but a principle which (to the best of my knowledge) has
never been formulated, to wit, the principle that the probability algorithm
associated with a composite system ought to supervene on the probability
algorithms associated with its component systems.
There are no “superpositions of correlations.” What leads to such awk-
ward expressions is the failure to distinguish between relations (between
objects) and correlations (between measurement outcomes). There are su-
perpositions of quantum states associated with entangled systems, which
superpositions are themselves quantum states, and which define correlations
between the outcomes of measurements performed on the entangled systems.
Instead of fixing relations among parts, the state of the whole determines
correlations between outcomes of measurements to which the parts can be
subjected. Nor can the joint state of the whole be taken as fundamental, for
a probability algorithm presupposes the events to which it serves to assign
probabilities. Entangled states are ways in which we describe composite
systems that are prepared in a certain ways, not ways in which they exist
out of relation to what happens or is the case in the macroworld.
EL [13] characterize their version of OSR as a holism, which consists in
“regarding the whole world—or the domain of the world that one considers—
as just one object in the last resort,” where “object” has “the same meaning
as in atomism, namely ‘being that exists independently of other beings’ (this
is one sense of the traditional term ‘substance’)”:
All the properties of that one object trivially are intrinsic prop-
erties, for there is nothing outside that object. . . . The idea is
that there is an internal differentiation within the whole such
that there are parts of the whole, and these parts have relational
properties, that is, they stand in certain relations to one another.
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Since the central idea of the present paper also lends itself to being described
as a holism (though I prefer to say what I mean without using this ambiguous
term), I am obliged to point out how it differs from the holism propounded
by EL [13].
To begin with, I fail to see how the latter can be cashed out consistently.
I see no sense in assigning a quantum state to the whole universe, nor in
regarding a quantum state as a description of a quantum system (except as
a description in terms of correlations between measurement outcomes). To
infer B from A, where A is the non-supervenience of the probability algo-
rithm associated with a whole on the probability algorithms associated with
its parts, and B is the non-supervenience of the properties of the whole on
the properties of its parts, is a non sequitur. What is actually affirmed is
not the existence of relations without (intrinsically distinct) relata but the
existence of correlations without correlata, and there is no way for correla-
tions between measurement outcomes to imply the existence of measurement
outcomes.29
The central idea of the present paper, according to which the macroworld
is manifested through a differentiation of an intrinsically undifferentiated en-
tity E , is not predicated on the entanglement of quantum systems. What
exists independently of other beings is not the world as a whole but E , to
whose differentiation the macroworld owes its existence. The differentiation
consists in the coming into being of indefinite spatial relations. Insofar as this
differentiation is internal, it is internal not to the whole world but to E , inas-
much as it is based on relations between E and itself. The self-differentiation
of E through reflexive relations does not abrogate the numerical identity of
the relata. It does, however, imply a new ontic dimension extending from
E to the manifested world, a dimension across which the atemporal process
of manifestation takes place. At one of its ends all fundamental particles in
existence are numerically identical, at the other end they are numerically
distinct.
The realism I propose goes beyond OSR in that it spells out how the
relational structure of the physical world is realized. What gets structured
is not a primitive, intrinsically unstructured multitude on which structure
is imposed. This would be another edition of the Platonic-Aristotelian du-
29Mermin’s thesis [75], according to which “Correlations have physical reality; that
which they correlate, does not,” has a different import. Mermin did not claim that
there are no correlata, only that they are not part of physical reality. His idea (at the
time) was that they belong to a larger reality which includes consciousness, and that the
measurement problem only arises in this larger reality.
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alism of Matter and Form.30 In fact, there is nothing that gets structured.
Structure comes to exist by an atemporal process of manifestation. A single,
structureless entity manifests structure by entering into reflexive relations—
both the indefinite relations which are instrumental in the manifestation
of the macroworld, and the resulting definite relations which constitute the
macroworld. It is true that without the relations there would be no relata,
but there would still be that which has the power to enter into reflexive
relations.
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